Security and status

What we have designed, and what nobody has checked yet.

This page separates three things: what is designed, what is verified, and what is not done. Orynt is early-stage and nothing here has been audited.

At a glance.

Security status at a glance
QuestionHonest answerStatus
Independent audit, penetration test or certificationNone by a human. No SOC 2, ISO 27001, penetration test or bug bounty exists. One AI-assisted independent review was done, its findings were fixed and regression tests added.Not done
Real fundsReal Lightning payments are verified on Bitcoin regtest only, a test network. Mainnet execution is disabled, and we are not asking anyone to use Orynt with real funds.Regtest only
Custody of funds or keysDesigned not to. The operator connects a wallet they control. Whether that is legally “non-custodial” is an open question for counsel.Designed
Protection against a double sendA single-use execution record is reserved before the wallet is called; a second send is refused until the wallet’s own record says what happened. On a real regtest node, 10 concurrent executes produced one payment.Verified · real regtest
Lost answersIn a real regtest run the API was killed after the wallet accepted a payment; after restart the payout was Unknown, was reconciled from the wallet’s record, and settled once.Verified · real regtest
Sign-in protectionsAuthenticator-app (TOTP) two-factor step-up, email verification, password reset and rate limits exist. Single sign-on does not.Built
Billing and card dataBilling uses a sandbox provider. No card details are collected and no card has ever been charged. Live checkout is written but not commissioned.Sandbox
Security contact and disclosure policyNot published yet.Planned
Who is responsible for securityOne person, the founder. There is no dedicated security role and no second reviewer yet.Honest limit

Threat model, in summary.

This is a plain-language summary drawn from the product brief and the due-diligence notes. It is not a formal threat model; it is not a substitute for a reviewed security document set.

What the design tries to prevent

  • Changed details after approval. Edits create new revisions and cancel earlier approvals; approvals sign an exact fingerprint of the payout.
  • Paying twice. One reservation per send, and no second send while the first is unresolved.
  • Unclear approvals. Signatures from device-held keys; roles checked at approval and again at execution.
  • Treating doubt as failure. A lost answer is Unknown until the wallet’s record says otherwise.
  • Forged or replayed receipts and webhooks. Signatures, timestamps and an offline verifier.
  • Quietly rewritten history. A hash-chained audit log makes edits detectable.

All of the above is design intent. None is independently reviewed.

What it does not defend against

  • Anyone holding your wallet credentials directly. They can bypass Orynt.
  • A compromised Orynt server that also holds wallet credentials. Not yet assessed; we make no guarantee.
  • A database administrator editing rows. See tamper-evident below.
  • A stolen approver device, or an approver who is tricked.
  • Paying the wrong real-world person, or paying for work that is never delivered.
  • Bugs in your wallet, node or the Lightning network.

Who enforces what.

The most important limit on this page.

Enforced by Orynt (application level)
  • How many approvers a payout needs, and who may approve
  • Thresholds and policy rules
  • One send per approved payout
  • Payment states and the receipt
Enforced by your wallet or node
  • Whether money can move at all
  • What the credentials you give Orynt are allowed to do
  • Any spending limits you set in the wallet itself

In short: protection of funds is only as strong as the wallet permissions you give Orynt.

Orynt’s rules are checked inside Orynt. They cannot stop someone who goes around it. Give the least permission that works, and consider keeping only what a payout cycle needs in the connected wallet.

Tamper-evident, not immutable.

Every important action is written to an audit log whose entries are chained by hashes, with signed checkpoints. If an entry is changed later, the chain stops adding up and a check can show it.

That is not the same as immutable. A database administrator can rewrite rows, and the chain only helps if you also kept an earlier copy of a checkpoint. We have not built external anchoring of checkpoints.

This is why receipts matter. A receipt carries the wallet’s payment preimage, and hashing it gives the payment hash. That proof of payment does not depend on Orynt’s database at all, and the offline verifier checks it without contacting us.

A receipt proves a payment. It does not prove delivery or quality of work, legal enforceability, the absence of other payments, or escrow.

Regtest only, for now.

Orynt is developed and demonstrated on Bitcoin regtest, a private test network with no monetary value. Mainnet execution is disabled.

The payments in the project’s real-node tests and demo are real Lightning payments between real software (bitcoind and LND), but of worthless test coins. The practice wallet is a simulator: its payments are labelled Simulated and can never produce a real receipt.

What is not audited or not done.

  • Independent human code, architecture or cryptography review
  • Penetration test
  • SOC 2, ISO 27001 or any other certification
  • Bug bounty
  • Signed releases, software bill of materials, reproducible builds
  • Insurance
  • Backups, disaster recovery and uptime commitments
  • A public deployment, hosting, subprocessors and data residency
  • Written incident-response plan
  • External anchoring of audit checkpoints
  • Single sign-on, and hardware- or passkey-backed approval keys (approval keys live in the browser)
  • Legal review of the design (see terms, privacy)

Reporting a problem.

There is no formal vulnerability-disclosure policy or dedicated security address yet; that is planned. Until it exists, use Contact support (choose the security category) or the contact form, and start your message with “security”. Please describe the issue in general terms and do not include secrets, keys or exploit details in the form.

Read the sources.

These documents sit in the project repository. The statements on this site are drawn from them.

  • docs/product/PRODUCT-BRIEF.md — what Orynt does and its honest limits
  • docs/EXECUTION-REGISTER.md — what is verified, with evidence
  • docs/business/security-due-diligence.md — buyer security questions and the honest answers
  • docs/business/risk-register.md — product, technical, market and regulatory risks
  • docs/business/legal-regulatory-register.md — open questions for counsel
  • docs/research/differentiation-review.md — a candid look at where Orynt is, and is not, different

More security documents: docs/security.

Security questions for a pilot?

Ask them. If we cannot answer honestly, we will say so, and that goes on our to-do list.